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Do Social Relations Affect Economic Welfare? A Microeconomic
Empirical Analysis
Summary
Over the last few years, many studies have shown that social networks affect the
socioeconomic development. This paper presents evidence, through the Italian
microdata representative of the entire Italian population, that the quality and quantity of
interpersonal relations of agents can increase their economic welfare. Two proxies of
interpersonal relations at an individual level are considered: a proxy for the density and
one for the quality of network structure of personal contacts. Both seem to have a
positive effect on the level of household economic welfare of agents. This result proves
robust to the inclusion of a variety of control variables and to the use of different
econometric methods.
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1. Introduction
Recently, many studies have devoted more and more attention to the investigation on the
effects that interpersonal relations have on economic variables. In particular, they are interested
in the relationship between: social relations and economic growth (e.g. Knack and Keefer 1997;
and Zak and Knack 2001); social relations and government performance (e.g. Putnam 1993;
Easterly and Levine 1997; Hall and Jones 1999; and La Porta et al. 1999); social relations and
human capital (e.g. Loury 1977; Coleman 1988; Goldin and Katz 1999; and Helliwell and
Putnam 1999); and social relations and financial development (e.g. Guiso, Sapienza and
Zingales 2004). With regard to this paper, in particular, it is worth stressing that there are many
contributions showing a significant correlation between economic performance and different
characteristics of social networks.
At an aggregate level, for example, Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001)
find that the level of trust present in a country and its economic performance are positively
associated. Narayan and Pritchett (1999) show that the level of social capital1 present in
different Tanzanian villages positively influences household wealth. Helliwell and Putnam
(1995) and Lyon (2005) find that growth in per capita income in Italy is positively associated
with an index of civic community which is measured by considering: Referendum Turnouts
(1974-1987), Preference Voting (1953-1979), Newspaper Readership (%; 1975) and
Association Density (1981). Granovetter (2005) analyses the impact of social networks on
economic outcomes. He stresses that social structure affects economic outputs for three main
reasons: “First, social networks affect the flow and the quality of information. Much
information is subtle, nuanced and difficult to verify, so actors do not believe impersonal
sources and instead rely on people they know. Second, social networks are an important source
of reward and punishment, since these are often magnified in their impact when coming from
others personally known. Third, trust, by which I mean the confidence that others will do the
“right” thing despite a clear balance of incentives to the contrary, emerges, if it does, in the
context of a social network.” (Granovetter, 2005, p.33)
At a micro level, many contributions have shown that social relations of individuals affect
the possibility of increasing personal income. Granovetter (1974) focuses on the role that
“Personal contacts” have on getting a job. Granovetter defines personal contacts as “individual
known personally to the respondent2, with whom he originally became acquainted in some
context unrelated to a search for job information, from whom he has found out about his new
job, or, who recommended to someone who then contacted him” (Granovetter, 1974, p.11). The
author finds evidence that personal contacts are the main channel through which the
unemployed get a job. Moreover, jobs found through personal contacts have higher wages than
1

The concept of social capital is often used by economists in order to analyse the role of interpersonal
relations in economics. There are many definitions of social capital and it is possible to identify two
principal approaches to this concept. The first one considers social capital as a variable that mostly
produces effects and is developed at an aggregate level. Putnam (1993), Fukuyama (1995, 1999),
Narayan and Pritchett (1999), Uphoff (2000), Paldam and Svendsen (2000), the World Bank (2005) are
exponents of this approach. The second one considers social capital at an individual level. The authors
adopting this approach interpret social capital as a notion that operates at an individual level. Coleman
(1988, 1990), DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999), Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2000), Glaeser, Laibson,
Scheinkman and Soutter (2000) use this approach. The aim of this paper is not to investigate the concept
of social capital and its features (for a discussion of social capital and its features see, for example,
Paldam 2000; Woolcock e Narayan 2000; Durlauf e Fafchamps 2004). However, it is useful for the
purposes of this work to refer sometimes to this notion. In these cases, the definitions of social capital
used will always be specified. Narayan and Pritchett define social capital as the “quantity and quality of
associational life and the related social norms” (Narayan and Pritchett 1999, p.872).
2
In the study of Granovetter (1974), the respondents are workers who have found a job in the last five
years.
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jobs found by “Formal means” (advertisements, public and private employment agencies,
interviews etc.) or “Direct applications” (when one goes directly to the firm without using a
formal or personal intermediary). Grootaert (1999), Grootaert and Narayan (1999) and
Grootaert, Oh and Swamy (1999) investigate the effect that the participation in local institutions
has on the household welfare respectively in Indonesia, Bolivia and Burkina Faso. These three
papers show that the participation in local associations reduces household poverty. The more
household is involved in local associations, the higher the per capita household expenditures are
and the better the access to credit of household is. Rose (1999) produces an empirical analysis
of Russia and shows that social networks positively affect individual welfare. Three aspects of
individual welfare are considered by the author: a measure of food consumption, a measure of
income security and a proxy of health. Individual welfare is studied in relation to three groups
of independent variables: individual attributes, social integration and generic social capital. The
social capital measures, in particular, include different kinds of social networks that individuals
can rely upon and that result positively correlated to individual welfare. Glaeser, Laibson,
Scheinkman and Soutter (2000) use an experimental framework and investigate the individual
determinants of trust and trustworthiness. They find, in a “trust game” design, that the family
status (measured by the number of hours spent working for pay, which is a negative indicator of
status, and by having a father that has a college degree) and charisma (measured by the number
of beers drunk per week and by the presence of a sexual partner) affects the amount of pay-off
gained by the agents in the trust game. The authors interpret status and charisma as components
of “individual social capital” that reflect the ability to gain return from social situations. People
with high level of individual social capital have more possibilities to reward and punish others
and are more able to induce trustworthy behaviour. According to the “social capital of
brokerage” idea of Burt (1992, 2002), people who are involved in networks that bridge the
structural hole between groups have advantages in getting information and in pursuing
rewarding opportunities. Burt shows that managers (Burt 2004) and bankers (Burt 2003) who
are connected to different groups of individuals that share alternative ideas and ways of thinking
are more able to get individual advantages such as higher salary, positive performance
evaluations, positive peer evaluations, promotions and good ideas.
This paper follows a microeconomic approach and investigates, using Italian microdata, the
effects of the social structure of personal contacts on household economic welfare. The main
contributions of this paper in relation to the previous literature are two. The first one is related
to the data used for the empirical work. The data are representative for the entire Italian
population. The use of national-level data bases is quite rare in this kind of study. The second
contribution is related to one of the proxies of social relations used in the empirical analysis.
Two proxies are considered. They reveal information about the quality and the quantity of
interpersonal relations that characterize the social life of individual agents. The proxy
constructed in order to capture the quality of the network structure of personal contacts
introduces original elements in the literature. This proxy reflects the satisfaction of agents in
social relations whereas the socio-economic literature that analyses at a micro level the effects
of the social network on economic outputs usually consider proxies of the density of
interpersonal relations. The proxy of the quality of social networks is constructed by using a
survey question with regards to the satisfaction of relationships with friends. In order to study
the effects of social relations on economic welfare it is not important just the number of social
relations that an individual has. What really matters is that the network is characterized by
relations based on trust and trustworthiness. Only these kinds of relations are a capital for
individuals. The proxy elaborated by measuring the satisfaction of relationships with friends
allows us to focus on the importance of the qualitative characteristics of social networks in
affecting individual economic welfare. The empirical evidence of this paper stresses that in
order to study the effects of social networks on personal economic welfare it is not possible to
neglect a direct consideration of the qualitative aspect of individual social relations. Both the
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density and the quality of the social structure of personal relations are simultaneously effective
on the possibility of agents to increase their economic welfare.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the variables and the methodology
used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 displays the basic ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions, testing the relations between social ties and household economic welfare, and the
sensitivity analysis. Section 4 concludes. Appendix 1 presents the summary statistics. Appendix
2 shows the empirical results obtained by investigating the same relations studied in section 3,
but using the discriminant analysis. It is useful to verify if the procedure adopted to create the
dependent variables used in the OLS analysis has produced some effective distortions in these
ones and in the OLS estimation. Appendix 3 describes the questions used in order to construct
the economic welfare indices and the independent variables.
2. Social relations and economic welfare: data and methodological issues
The data considered in this paper are from the “Indagine Multiscopo sulle Famiglie-Aspetti
della Vita Quotidiana”, a research published yearly from 1993 by ISTAT (The Italian National
Institute of Statistics). In particular, the present analysis uses the microdata relating to two
different years: 1993 and 2001. In these two years, the surveys examined 19.748 and 19.920
households and 55.844 and 53.113 individuals respectively.
The principal goal of the empirical analysis is to investigate the relationship between
household economic welfare and the interpersonal relations of head of family (data collected in
the ISTAT’s databases refer to social relations of head of familiy).
Two aspects of social relations are separately considered in this paper: the quantitative and
the qualitative one. The quantitative aspect of social relations is measured by considering the
relationships that agents form inside some particular types of formal institutions: the voluntary
associations. The qualitative aspect is elaborated by considering the satisfaction in relationships
with friends. One can imagine that these two aspects of social relations are positively correlated
and this is true for the proxies considered in this paper (the correlation is equal to about 64%). If
an individual decides to maintain and extend his/her social network, it is possible to imagine
that he is satisfied with his/her social relations3. However, the distinction between these two
aspects of social relations seem to be significant to understand the economic effects of all the
different social behaviours of agents. This idea seems to be correct if we consider that both the
proxy of quantitative social relations and the proxy of qualitative social relations are significant,
if introduced in the same regression, to explain the role of social ties to increase the household
economic welfare (Section 3).
The proxy of the quantitative aspect of social ties is an indicator of social participation. It
reflects the propensity of individuals to participate in different groups. It is named membership
and reflects the propensity of single agents to participate in “Putnam associations”4. Three types
of groups are considered:
3

Probably, this is due to the role of social skills of individuals that can affect both the ability to create and
maintain social relations and the ability to cultivate these in a satisfactory way.
4
Olson (1982) and Putnam (1993) offer two different explanations of the impact of private associations
on economic growth and on social cohesion. Olson stresses some negative effects of associations. He
argues that private associations pursue the special interests of its members and, for this reason, generate
social costs and reduce social cohesion. In particular, this is a consequence of the fact that only the
smaller associations emerge in the society and the small associations defend special interests of small
groups. On the contrary, larger organizations, representing the interests of numerous individuals, are
inefficient because they present many coordination problems and they cannot emerge in the society.
Putnam emphasizes the propensity of groups to generate trust, social ties and civicness among people.
Knack and Keefer (1997) and Knack (2003) investigate, at an empirical level, the different hypotheses of
Olson and Putnam. Knack and Keefer (1997) and Knack (2003) consider the different characteristics of
groups and distinguish between “Putnam” associations (education, arts, music or cultural activities; local
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• cultural associations
• volunteer organizations
• ecological, human rights and peace associations.
This proxy has been computed by calculating the arithmetic mean of the number of associations
the head of the family joined over the last year (Appendix 3).
The proxy of the qualitative aspect of social ties, named satisfaction, reflects the satisfaction
of the head of family in interpersonal relations. It is constructed by using a survey question with
regard to satisfaction of relationships with friends. The available responses to this question are:
“not satisfied with the relationships with friends”, “not very satisfied”, “somewhat satisfied”
and “very satisfied” (Appendix 3). This index of satisfaction of relationships with friends
appears very useful in illustrating the quality of interpersonal relations characterizing the social
life of agents. Not all the encounters among agents produce “positive relational outputs” such as
mutual trust, closeness and reciprocal respect (Gui 2002)5. An encounter can generate “negative
relational outputs” too, such as, among others, rancour and hatred. The proxy of satisfaction
with social ties above described enables us to understand if the interpersonal relations of agents
produce mostly positive or negative outputs and, consequently, if the social networks of agents
are characterized by ties the agents can effectively rely upon. Essentially, it allows us to
understand the role of qualitative characteristics in making social relations a capital that
individuals can use to increase their economic welfare. Individuals can take more advantage
from the social network if this network is characterized by relations based on trust and the more
one is satisfied with social relations, the more it is likely that these relations link people who
trust each other.
Both the proxies of social ties described are analysed in association with household
economic welfare. Since there is not a direct measure of household income or household wealth
in the data collected in the “Indagine Multiscopo”, two different household economic welfare
indices have been elaborated using these data. These two indices present different information
about household economic welfare. The first one can be considered a Subjective index of
Economic Welfare (hereafter also SEW) and the second one an Objective index of Economic
Welfare (hereafter also OEW).
The SEW has been elaborated by standardizing and calculating the average of the values
related to:
• the responses of head of family about the general economic situation of the family
• the responses of head of family about financial difficulties to meet some expenditures.
(See appendix 3 for the specific questions used to calculate this index)
The responses of head of family about the general economic situation essentially reflect
subjective considerations. They reveal satisfaction with regard to the economic situation of the
family. This satisfaction depends mostly on personal expectations and on the consideration of
the relative situation of each household group in respect to other ones belonging to the same
social class. Similar considerations are valid for the responses about financial difficulties in
meeting various expenditures. These responses can be determined by objective economic
community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality; youth work, e.g. scouts,
guides, youth clubs, etc.; sports or recreation associations) and “Olson” associations (professional
associations; trade unions; political parties or groups). The associations considered in this paper to study
the impact of social relations on economic welfare are identified as Putnam association following the
criteria used by these authors.
5
This concept of positive relational outputs is very close to the notion of relational goods developed by
Gui (2002). Gui stresses that each economic transaction among agents produces different outputs. These
outputs are for example: the exchange of economic goods, contract supplies, the variation of the human
capital of agents involved in the transaction and the production of relational goods. Relational goods are
the emotional effects of the transactions such as the feeling between agents and the pleasure that they
have in communicating.
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difficulties, but the perception of difficulties depends also on the comparison between one’s
budgetary constraint and one’s desired level of expenditure. This is a subjective element that
plays an important role in this analysis. For these reasons, the SEW seems to be an index that
mainly reflects subjective considerations on household economic welfare.
The OEW has been elaborated by standardizing and calculating the average of the values
related to:
• the possession of some durable consumer goods
• the characteristics of the physical structure of house.
(See appendix 3 for the specific questions used to calculate this index)
Both these aspects do not reflect subjective considerations. The head of family simply lists a
series of durable consumer goods and some characteristics of the physical structure of house.
In order to verify the reliability of these two economic welfare indices, it has been
elaborated a measure both of SEW and of OEW at regional level and this measure has been
related to the regional per capita GDP. The correlations between the SEW and the regional per
capita GDP is equal to about 83%, the correlations between the OEW and the regional per
capita GDP is equal to about 65%.
The SEW and the OEW are the dependent variables in the empirical analysis and have been
calculated with reference to the year 2001.
Conversely, the independent variables, the two indices of social relations and a variable
named education that reflects the educational qualification of agents (Appendix 3) have been
calculated with reference to the year 19936. This allows us to minimize the endogeneity
problems.
Since the sample has changed over the two considered years, it was not possible to directly
associate the variables related to the heads of the families with reference to 1993 and the
economic welfare indices of 2001. For this reason, with regard to the age and the region of the
heads of the families, different groups of the heads of the families (and of their relative
household group) were created, both referring to 1993 and 2001. There are 247 groups for each
year. The 247 groups were derived by a grouping based on 19 regions7 and 13 age brackets (the
age brackets range 5 years and include the heads of families from 23 to 87 years old). The
groups comprise an average of 75 observations. Groups including the heads of the families who
are from 18 to 23 years old and above 87 years old were excluded due to insufficient data.
Because 21 groups included in the 247 analysed comprise less than 20 observations, all the
equations that are proposed in the next section have been newly calculated using only groups
larger than 20 observations. The results do not change in the two different analyses. For each
dependent and independent variable the arithmetic mean of the standardized values associated to
each individual was calculated with reference to each group and the regressions were conducted
based on these means. Because of that, the variables used in the empirical analysis are no longer
categorical variables, but continuous ones.
Section 3 displays the results of the empirical analysis conducted using the OLS method. In
particular, section 3.1 presents the empirical results with reference to the associations between
subjective household economic welfare index and social relations. Section 3.2 shows the results
regarding the relationships between interpersonal relations and the objective household
economic welfare index. Section 3.3 presents the sensitivity analysis conducted introducing
changes in terms of control variables in the OLS estimations presented in sections 3.1 and 3.2.
The dependent variables considered in the OLS estimations have been calculated aggregating
ordinal data derived by survey questions. In order to further prove the robustness of the OLS
results other two dependent variables have been constructed using a different aggregation
6

Other explanatory variables, used in the sensitivity analysis, are introduced subsequently. Summary
statistics of all the variables used in the analysis are presented in Appendix 1.
7
There are 20 Italian regions, but Valle d’Aosta and Piemonte are considered together in the “Indagine
Multiscopo”.
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method. Instead of calculating the arithmetic mean, the individual data derived from questions
on the economic situation of families have been added. The household economic welfare indices
obtained are categorical variables instead of continuous ones. These categorical dependent
variables have been studied using the discriminant analysis that essentially confirms the results
of the OLS regressions. Appendix 2 shows the result of the discriminant analysis.
3. Social relations and household economic welfare
3.1.Social relations and the subjective household economic welfare index
Table 1 presents the results of the regression in which the dependent variable is the
subjective household economic welfare index and the independent variables are: membership,
satisfaction and education.
Tab. 1 Social relations and the subjective economic welfare (OLS)
Dependent variable: the subjective economic welfare index
Variable

Coefficient

Constant

0.645

0.028

23.285

0.000

Membership

0.172

0.052

3.289

0.001

Satisfaction

0.037

0.010

3.611

0.000

Education

-0.004

0.002

-1.829

0.069

R-squared

0.147

Mean dependent var

0.751

Adj. R-squared

0.136

S.D. dependent var

0.027

S.E. of
regression
Sum squared
resid.
Log likelihood

0.025

Akaike info criterion

-4.500

0.156

Schwarz criterion

-4.443

F-statistic

13.910

Prob(F-statistic)

0.000

559.772

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

Sample size is 247

The R2 of regression is equal to 13.6%. There is a correlation between all the regressors and the
subjective index of economic welfare (SEW). The individuals showing a greater propensity to
participate in Putnam associations and those that are more satisfied with their relations with
friends, present a higher subjective household economic welfare. The relation between
educational qualification and the subjective household economic welfare is negative and
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. While the educational qualification increases, the
SEW decreases. This is an interesting conclusion if one considers that some studies show a
negative correlation between human capital and the satisfaction of individuals with reference to
different variables. Clark and Oswald (1996), for example, using British data, show a negative
association between education rate and job satisfaction. More in general, over the last few years,
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many contributions have shown that the satisfaction of individuals with regard to their income
or consumption is not determined only by the absolute level of these variables. Two other
factors would contribute to increase individual satisfaction with reference to economic
condition.
First, it is currently accepted that the satisfaction of agents depends also on the comparison
between the individual level of income and/or consumption and the level of income and/or
consumption reached by others. In this context, a pioneer research was carried out by Hirsch
(1976). He argues that after a society has completely and widely satisfied primary needs it turns
to the satisfaction of positional and relational needs. Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) show that
the choice of women to work depends on the comparison between their individual household
income and the income of household that are included in their social class. Corneo and Jeanne
(1999) show that the wish to reach a high social status is an incentive to accumulate wealth and,
for this reason, it can foster economic growth. Clark and Oswald (1996) and Clark (1997) find
that the relative income matters for job satisfaction. Luttmer (2005) shows that, controlling for
individual and local characteristics, higher earnings of neighbours are correlated to lower levels
of self-reported happiness. Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) finds that “the larger an individual’s own
income is in comparison with the income of the reference group, the happier the individual is”
(Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005, p.1015)
Second, personal expectations with regard to the possibility of reaching some results (in
terms of income, consumption etc.) seems to be relevant to individual satisfaction. Clark (1997)
finds that women consistently have higher job satisfaction than men even if the women’s job is
less paid and is worse in terms of hiring, job content and promotion opportunities. Clark argues
that “The resolution of this paradox is suggested to lie in the importance of expectations in wellbeing: those who expected less from working will be more satisfied with any given job” (Clark
1997, p.342). Sacco and Vanin (2000) consider a simulation model of network interaction and
show that aspirations are a key factor in generating satisfaction. Stutzer (2004) investigates the
effect of income aspiration on agents’ utility. The empirical results show that higher income
aspirations reduce satisfaction with life. The existing literature seems to support the idea that
two individuals with the same level of income but with different personal expectations could
have different satisfaction with their situations. As Clark and Oswald (1996) argue in order to
explain the negative correlation between the education rate and job satisfaction, it is plausible
that a higher level of educational qualification corresponds to higher personal aspirations. A
higher level of educational qualification corresponds to a larger investment in education. Larger
investments are justified by the expectations of greater income in the future. This could explain
the negative correlation between the SEW and the educational qualification shown in table 1.
As it will be shown in the next section, the correlation between the objective household
economic welfare and the educational qualification is positive. It means that the heads of the
families with higher education in effect reach higher level of objective economic welfare but
they are less satisfied with their welfare. The negative association between the educational
qualification and the subjective household economic welfare seems to be the principal result of
the regression presented in table 1. In fact, it is important to stress the positive correlation
between the level of individual interpersonal relations and the SEW. Nevertheless, the particular
character of the dependent variable makes it difficult to interpret the correlations between the
indices of social relations and the subjective household economic welfare. In order to
understand if economic relations are effective in the creation of economic outputs, it is better to
analyse the relationships between the two variables: membership and satisfaction and the
objective index of economic welfare. This is the aim of the next section.
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3.2.Social relations and the objective household economic welfare index
In this section, the empirical relationships between the social ties characterizing the social
life of heads of families and the level of the objective household economic welfare (OEW) is
analysed. Table 2 presents the results of the regression estimated using the OLS. These results
show a positive and statistically significant association between the three independent variables
and the OEW. However, in this case, the OLS method does not appear appropriate because the
Ramsey RESET test reveals that the relation estimated in table 2 is not correctly specified and
that there are some non linear relations between the independent variables and the dependent
ones.
Tab.2 Social relations and the objective economic welfare (OLS)
Dependent variable: the objective economic welfare index
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

Constant

0.089

0.055

1.622

0.106

Membership

0.493

0.103

4.780

0.000

Satisfaction

0.083

0.020

4.117

0.000

Education

0.030

0.005

6.199

0.000

R-squared

0.542

Mean dependent var

0.489

Adj. R-squared

0.536

S.D. dependent var

0.073

S.E.
of
regression
Sum
squared
resid
Log likelihood

0.050

Akaike info criterion

-3.141

0.606

Schwarz criterion

-3.084

F-statistic

95.757

Prob(F-statistic)

0.000

391.884

Sample size is 247

As a result, to study the effects of social relations on objective household economic welfare
index, a fuzzy method was used. The fuzzy logic and the fuzzy set theory have been used in
many disciplines since Zadeh’s pioneering contribution (1965). In economics, these tools have
been applied since the nineties. The fuzzy set theory is useful in case the analysis regards some
variables characterized by elements that can not be divided into clearly bounded groups. In
particular: “A fuzzy set is a class of objects with a continuum of grades of membership. Such a
set is characterized by a membership (characteristic) function which assigns to each object a
grade of membership ranging between zero and one.” (Zadeh 1965, p.338). Let us assume that
one wants to distinguish between the young and the old inside a group of individuals. What does
“young” mean exactly? And “old”? The fuzzy set theory suggests the assignment of a “grade of
membership” to each individual which is associated with the two different groups of the young
and the old. In this case, the grades of membership characterize the individuals according to
their age. A baby will have, for example, a very high grade of membership associated with the
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set of young and a very low grade of membership associated with the set of old. In this paper,
the fuzzy logic and the related fuzzy set theory are useful to investigate the connections between
the interpersonal relations and the objective household economic welfare. The application of
these tools is justified by two reasons. One is the non linear relationship characterizing the
analysis presented in table 2. The fuzzy method allows us to study the impact of each
independent variable on the dependent one even if this effect is not linear. The second reason is
the fuzzy character of the variable satisfaction. The categories associated to these variables, that
are “not satisfied with the relationships with friends”, “not very satisfied”, “somewhat satisfied”
and “very satisfied”, are the expression of qualitative judgments. It is possible to imagine that
people having similar but not exactly equal degrees of satisfaction are included in the same
category. The fuzzy method allows us to associate to each person a grade of membership in
three alternative degrees of satisfaction: “low” “medium” and “high”. In this way, it is possible
to better understand the qualitative character of this variable. In order to conduct the fuzzy
analysis, each independent variable is partitioned into three fuzzy sets by grouping the “high”,
“medium” and “low” values of the variables. A grade of membership in each of the three fuzzy
sets is associated with each observation. The method used in this paper to generate the fuzzy
sets and the grade of membership is that reported in Giles and Draeseke (2001)8. Table 3 reports
the results of the regression conducted using the tool of fuzzy logic. The regression presented in
table 3 is a OLS regression in which each regressor is considered three times.
Each time the single regressors are weighed by the grades of membership associated with
the three different partitioned sets. The grades of membership are named with the letter U plus
the name of the regressor and a number that reflects the fuzzy sets “high”, “medium” and “low”.
For example, the grade of membership associated with the high set of values of the variable
satisfaction is named Usatisfaction1. In table 3, specifically, Constant, Usatisfaction3 and
Ueducation3 are constants; Membership, Satisfaction and Education are the regressors related to
the grade of membership associated with the medium sets of values,
Usatisfaction3*Satisfaction, Ueducation1*education and Ueducation3*education are the
regressors weighed by the grades of membership in the high (in the case of
Ueducation1*education) or low (in the case of Usatisfaction3*Satisfaction and
Ueducation3*education) sets. The regression presented in table 3 is obtained by eliminating one
after the other the non statistically significant regressors. Initially, the variables included in the
regression were all the grade of membership (that are constants) and the three variables
Membership, Satisfaction and Education weighed by all the three grades of membership
associated with the sets “high”, “medium” and “low”.

8

For a discussion about the fuzzy logic and the fuzzy set theory see: Zadeh (1965, 1987) and, from an
economic perspective: Lindström (1998) and Giles and Draeseke (2001).
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Tab.3 Social relations and the objective economic welfare (Fuzzy logic)
Dependent variable: the objective economic welfare index
Variable
Constant

Coefficient
0.010

Std. Error
0.084

t-Statistic
0.113

Prob.
0.910

Usatisfaction3

0.736

0.188

3.913

0.000

Ueducation3

0.285

0.113

2.522

0.012

Membership

0.443

0.093

4.748

0.000

Satisfaction

0.086

0.030

2.896

0.004

Education

0.056

0.012

4.700

0.000

Usatisfaction3*Satisfaction

-0.227

0.059

-3.835

0.000

Ueducation1*education

-0.010

0.005

-1.955

0.052

Ueducation3*education

-0.073

0.025

-2.954

0.003

R-squared

0.647

Mean dependent var

0.489

Adjusted R-squared

0.635

S.D. dependent var

0.073

S.E. of regression

0.044

Akaike info criterion

-3.360

Sum squared resid

0.467

Schwarz criterion

-3.232

F-statistic

54.411

Prob(F-statistic)

0.000

Log likelihood

423.941

Sample size is 247

Figures 1, 2 and 3 show, by considering the estimated coefficient obtained in table 3, the
effects that each independent variable produces on the objective household economic welfare
index.
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Fig.1 The effect of formal social participation
on the objective economic welfare index
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Fig.2 The effect of informal social participation
on the objective economic welfare index
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Fig.3 The effect of educational qualification
on the objective economic welfare index
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The effect of the variable membership on the objective household economic welfare is
positive and linear (figure 1), the other two independent variables (satisfaction and education)
seem to present a threshold effect. A greater satisfaction in relationships with friends and a
higher level of education are associated with a greater level of objective household economic
welfare, but this association is confirmed only until a specific value of these two independent
variables. In particular, a growing satisfaction in the relations with friends increases the
objective household economic welfare only for the range of values of satisfaction included
between zero and about three (figure 2). Three is the value associated, in the questionnaire filled
in by the heads of the families, with the assertion: “somewhat satisfied with relationships with
friends”. This result suggests an essential consideration. When individuals reach a fairly high
level of satisfaction in the relationships with friends, the channels by which the quality of social
relations can promote the objective household economic welfare are fully exploited by the
individuals. An individual who is not satisfied or has a low level of satisfaction with the
relationships with friends, improving the quality of his network structure, acquires some
advantages, for example in terms of possibility to obtain information by other agents, and
increases the possibility of reaching a higher level of household economic welfare. The
transition from a situation in which individuals are somewhat satisfied with relationships with
friends to a situation in which they are very satisfied does not appear to produce positive effects
on the OEW. For this reason, we can assume that there is a threshold effect related to the
variable that captures the quality of social relations.
A similar effect is associated with the variable education. The educational qualification is
associated with a growing OEW but only until the value of educational qualification is equal to
about four that is the value associated with the Junior high School (figure 3).
To study the real presence of these two threshold effects that result in the fuzzy analysis, an
OLS regression was conducted (table 4) in which two variables satisfaction and education are
bounded according to the indications resulting in figures 2 and 3.
Tab.4 Social relations and the objective economic welfare (bounded OLS)
Dependent variable: the objective economic welfare index
Variable

Coefficient

Constant

-0.091

Std.
Error
0.063

tStatistic
-1.437

0.152

Membership

0.417

0.092

4.546

0.000

Satisfaction*(Satisfaction<=3.1)+(Satisfaction>3.1)*3.1

0.110

0.024

4.509

0.000

Education*(Education<=4.0)+(Education>4.0)*4.0

0.063

0.008

8.244

0.000

R-squared

0.619

Adj. R-squared

0.614

S.E. of regression

0.046

Sum squared resid

0.504

Mean dependent
var
S.D. dependent
var
Akaike info
criterion
Schwarz criterion

Log likelihood

414.544

F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

Prob.

0.489
0.0733
-3.324
-3.267
131.354
0.000

Sample size is 247
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The threshold effects seem to be effective close to a value of 3.1, for the variable
satisfaction, and a value of 4 for the variable education. Compared to the regression in table 2,
this bounded regression explains a higher percentage in the variation of the dependent variable
(61.4% against 53.6%) and presents a lower standard error. Moreover, the Ramsey RESET test
reveals that the relations estimated in this regression is correctly specified. It is thus interesting
to calculate the precise effect of the two variables of social relations on the objective household
economic welfare. In the equation presented in table 4, if membership were to increase by one
standard deviation, the objective household economic welfare would increase by roughly 1.7%.
If satisfaction were to increase by one standard deviation, the objective household economic
welfare would increase by roughly 2.3%9. A sensitivity analysis is presented in the next section.
3.3 The sensitivity analysis with control variables on the OLS regressions
Table 5 shows the results of the sensitivity analysis regarding the relationships between the
social ties of the head of family and the level of the objective household economic welfare.
Tab. 5 Social relations and the OEW: a sensitivity analysis (bounded OLS)
Dependent variable: the objective economic welfare index
Variables included in the Coefficient of Membership
Coefficient of Satisfaction
basic equation (Tab. 4)
None

0.417
(0.092)

0.110
(0.024)

Regional dummies

0.622
(0.107)

0.064
(0.025)

Cohort dummies

0.328
(0.074)

0.067
(0.020)

Employed

0.304
(0.089)

0.105
(0.023)

Source of income

0.303
(0.089)

0.105
(0.023)

Profession°

0.407
(0.097)

0.134
(0.039)

Cohort dummies, Regional
dummies

0.378
(0.084)

0.012
(0.019)

Employed, Source of income,
Profession°

0.310
(0.094)

0.126
(0.038)

Standard error are shown in parentheses. The independent variables include educational qualification.
Sample size is 247. ° Sample size is 209. Sample size is smaller when the variable Profession is included
because in many cases the answer to this question is non present in the survey. In those cases the
observation were deleted from the sample.

9

This percentage is calculated by multiplying the standard deviation of the variable by his estimated
coefficient.
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The first row reports the coefficients and the standard errors of the two variables
membership and satisfaction as they are shown in table 4. The following rows report the
coefficients and the standard errors of these two independent variables when one or more
control variables are introduced in the basic relation analysed in table 4. The control variables
considered in the second and in the third row are two different dummies: the first one reflects
the Italian regions (row 2) and the second one refers to the age of the head of the family (row
3)10. The introduction of the cohort dummies allows us to verify that the positive relation
between the level of interpersonal relations and the objective household economic welfare is not
merely due to an age effect. Both the regional dummies and the cohort dummies do not
eliminate the effects of the variables membership and satisfaction on the objective household
economic welfare. The control variable employed (row 4) is a dummy assuming a value of 1 if
the head of the family has a job, and value of 0 if he is unemployed11. The variable profession
(row 5) assumes three values: a value of 3 is associated with the jobs generating a potential
“high income”, a value of 2 and a value of 1 are associated with the jobs with a potentially
lower income12. The variable source of income assumes a value of 1 or 0 depending on the main
source of household income: if it is an income from work (value 1) or not (value 0)13. The
cohort dummies and the regional dummies are considered simultaneously in row 7. The
variables employed, profession and source of income are considered, at the same time, in row 8.
The variables of social interactions membership and satisfaction are statistically significant
in all the situation considered except when the cohort dummies and the regional dummies are
introduced at the same time and only in regard to the variable satisfaction. The variable
education, that is always considered in the estimations presented in table 5, is positively and
statistically significant at least at the 5 percent in all the regressions except when the three
control variables: employed, profession and source of income are considered at the same time
(row 8).
The sensitivity analysis seems to confirm that the participation in formal and informal social
relations can increase the level of household economic welfare, and, in particular, this result is
robust to the inclusion of a variety of control variables. The control variables analysed are also
considered in the study of relations between the social ties and the subjective household
economic welfare index (table 6).

10

This dummy variable refers to four groups: the heads of the families who are from 23 to 37 years old,
from 38 to 52 and from 53 and 67 and from 67 to 87.
11
As described in section 2, the econometric analysis is conducted on values that represent an average
value for a group of the heads of the families. The groups are derived by a grouping based on 19 regions
and 13 age brackets. The cohort dummies and the region dummies are associated directly with the single
groups. Alternatively, the control variables: employed, source of income and profession are initially
referred to the single heads of the families. Subsequently, for these variables, the group means are
calculated as they are for the other independent variables. For this reason, the variable employed can
assume all the values between 0 and 1. The value 0 represents the groups in which everyone is
unemployed, the value 1 is associated with the groups where each individual has a job. Similarly, the
variables source of income and profession, described below, assume values ranging respectively between
1 and 3 and between 0 and 1.
12
The profession associated with the value of 3 are: executive, middle-ranking, entrepreneur, selfemployed person and professional, value of 2: salaried employee and foreman, value of 1: manual
worker, partner in a co-operative society and house worker.
13
The source of income assuming 0 are: pension, benefit payment, estate income and household
maintenance, the source of income assuming 1 are: self-employment income and income from
employment.
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Tab. 6 Social relations and the SEW: a sensitivity analysis (bounded OLS)
Dependent variable: the subjective economic welfare index
Variables included in the Coefficient of Membership
basic equation (Tab. 1)

Coefficient of Satisfaction

None

0.172
(0.052)

0.037
(0.010)

Regional dummies

-0.012
(0.043)

0.004
(0.007)

Cohort dummies

0.181
(0.093)

0.093
(0.011)

Employed

0.191
(0.053)

0.038
(0.010)

Source of incombe

0.191
(0.053)

0.038
(0.010)

Profession°

0.185
(0.052)

0.042
(0.013)

Cohort dummies, Regional
dummies

-0.029
(0.045)

0.000
(0.008)

Employed, Source of income,
Profession°

0.200
(0.054)

0.042
(0.013)

Standard error are shown in parentheses. The independent variables include the Educational qualification.
Sample size is 247. ° Sample size is 209. Sample size is smaller when the variable Profession is included
because in many cases the answer to this question is non present in the survey. In those cases the
observation were deleted from the sample.

The first row presents the coefficients and the standard errors of membership and
satisfaction as they are reported in table 1. The others rows show the coefficient and the
standard errors of these two variables when the control variables are considered in the analysis.
Table 6 shows that membership and satisfaction remain significant when the cohort dummies
and the variables employed, profession and source of income are introduced in the regression.
Membership and satisfaction are not significant if the region dummies are considered. The
variable education, that is negatively correlated with the SEW in the analysis proposed in table
1, is no longer significant if one or more control variables are introduced in the regression.
4. Conclusion
Using Italian microdata, this paper investigates the association between the social structure
of personal contacts and the individual economic household welfare. Many theoretical and
empirical studies have shown that social networks have a role in promoting positive economic
outputs (Granovetter 1974, 2005; Helliwell and Putnam 1995; Knack and Keefer 1997;
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Grootaert 1999; Grootaert and Narayan 1999; Grootaert, Oh and Swamy 1999; Rose 1999;
Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter 2000; Zak and Knack 2001; Lyon 2005; Granovetter
2005). This paper has two main peculiarities with respect to the existing literature. First, the
empirical analysis uses a very ample dataset representative of the entire Italian population.
Second, it does not refer just to the density of social network, but it considers a proxy of the
qualitative aspect of social structure. This distinction allows us to measure the effects of social
relations on economic welfare by considering both the number and the intrinsic characteristic of
the social relations of individuals. The quantitative aspect refers to the participation in voluntary
associations. It is captured by the number of cultural, volunteer, ecological, human rights and
peace associations the individuals participate in. The qualitative aspect concerns the satisfaction
of agents in relations with friends. Individuals can take more advantage from the social network
if this network is characterized by relations based on trust and trustworthiness. The satisfaction
in relations with friends is a proxy of the quality concerning the network structure of personal
contacts. The more one is satisfied with social relations, the more it is likely that these relations
link people who trust each other. These two proxies of the quantity and quality of social
relations have been analysed with regard to two different indices of household economic
welfare: a subjective and an objective economic welfare index. The subjective household
economic welfare has been constructed using: a) the responses of the head of the family about
the general economic situation of the family and b) the responses of the head of the family about
financial difficulties in meeting some expenditures. It essentially reveals subjective
considerations of the heads of families on the economic and financial situation of their families.
The objective household economic welfare has been measured considering: a) the possession of
some durable consumer goods and b) the characteristics of the physical structure of the house. It
reflects objective elements concerning the economic welfare of families. The analysis shows
that both these economic welfare indices are positively associated with the two proxies of social
relations. The importance of both the qualitative and the quantitative aspect of social relations in
the empirical analysis stresses that these aspects must be both explicitly considered in order to
completely understand the effects of social network on economic performance. If we just look at
the density of network structure of personal contacts we lose a relevant piece of information.
This result raises interesting under-investigated questions. First, the interrelations between the
quantity and the quality of the social relations of agents could be interestingly analysed. Are
individuals connected to many people always more satisfied in interpersonal relations? Second,
this paper does not consider the factors that affect the formation of satisfying social relations. Is
the satisfaction in social relation mostly related directly to the social skills of single agents or is
it mostly connected to the social environment?
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Appendices
Appendix 1. Summary statistics
Variable
Subjective
household
economic
welfare (SEW)
Objective
household
economic
welfare
(OEW)
Membership
Satisfaction
Education
Employed
Source of
incombe
Profession

Obs.

Mean

247

0.751

Std.
Deviation
0.027

minimum

maximum

0.653

0.806

247

0.489

0.073

0.312

0.630

247
247
247
247

0.055
3.068
3.949
0.500

0.040
0.206
0.900
0.393

0
2.242
2.091
0

0.217
3.583
5.583
1

247
209

0.494
2.396

0.391
0.342

0
1

0.990
3

Appendix 2. Social relations and household economic welfare: the discriminant
analysis
This appendix investigates, by using the discriminant analysis, the relationship between the
household economic welfare and the quality and quantity of interpersonal relations of single
agents. The discriminant analysis allows us to verify the robustness of the OLS results. The two
household economic welfare indices considered in the empirical analysis of section 2 are
continuous variables. They have been calculated by using the arithmetic mean. In this appendix
a new aggregation method is proposed. With regard to each individual, the data obtained by the
survey questions on the household economic welfare have been added. In this way we computed
two new household economic welfare indices that are the sum of the values related to the survey
questions and are categorical variables. As in section 2, different groups of the heads of the
families (and of their relative household group) were created with regard to the age and the
region of the heads of the families. There are 247 groups. The 247 groups were derived by a
grouping based on 19 regions and 13 age brackets (the age brackets range 5 years and include
the heads of families from 23 to 87 years old). The discriminant analysis with regard to both the

20
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2007

21

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 27 [2007]

objective and the subjective household economic welfare index is conducted on these 247
groups considering, for each group, the median of the indices’ values associated to the
individuals that belong to the different groups. The new subjective economic welfare index
presents only three different values, 19, 20 and 21, that are the sum of the values related to the
survey questions used to compute this index. These values reflect a growing satisfaction of the
head of the family with the welfare reached by the household. The new objective economic
welfare index assumes thirteen values from 9 to 21. In order to have the same number of values
in respect to the two indices, and in order to facilitate the interpretation of the discriminant
analysis results, the thirteen values of the new objective economic welfare index were
aggregated in three classes representing household with a high, medium and low objective
economic welfare. The discriminant analysis was therefore conducted on the two new indices
divided into three classes of household economic welfare.
Section 1 shows the results of the discriminant analysis referred to the new objective
economic welfare index. Section 2 presents the discriminant analysis related to the new
subjective economic welfare index.
1. The discriminant analysis related to the objective economic welfare index
Tables 1, 2and 3 present the results of the discriminant analysis with regard to the objective
economic welfare index.
Tab. 1 Eigenvalue, Canonical Correlation and Wilks’Lambda
Function Eigenvalue
1
2

1.714(a)
.059(a)

% of
Cumulative Canonical Wilks’Lambda
ChiDf Sig.
Variance
%
cor.
Square
96.7
96.7
.795
.348
256.418 6 .000
3.3
100.0
.235
.945
13.821 2 .001

Tab. 2 Structure Matrix and Classification function
Structure matrix
Function 1
function 2

Constant
Membership
Satisfaction
Education

.518
.639(*)
.883(*)

Classification function
low objective med
high
economic
objective
objective
welfare
economic
economic
welfare
welfare
-182.366
-218.059
-219.906
-185.662
-182.361
-161.229
123.848
131.831
130.956
3.816
7.005
7.700

.750(*)
-.388
.049
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Tab. 3 Classification Results (b,c)

Original

Count

%

Crossvalidate(a)

Count

%

Objective
economic
welfare
Low

Predicted Group Membership
Low
70

medium
6

high
1

Total
77

Med.

12

60

36

108

High

0

24

38

62

Low

90.9

7.8

1.3

100.0

Med.

11.1

55.6

33.3

100.0

High

.0

38.7

61.3

100.0

Low

70

6

1

77

Med.

12

60

36

108

High

0

25

37

62

Low

90.9

7.8

1.3

100.0

Med.

11.1

55.6

33.3

100.0

High

.0

40.3

59.7

100.0

(a) Cross validation is done only for those cases in the analysis. In cross validation, each case is classified
by the functions derived from all cases other than that case.
b 68.0% of original grouped cases correctly classified.
c 67.6% of cross-validated original grouped cases correctly classified.

The first discriminant function explains 96.7% of the variance. The canonical correlation
indicating the association between the groups and the groups centroid is high, in particular in
regard to the first discriminant function. This result reveals a good discriminant strength of the
functions that is confirmed by the Wilks’ Lambda Test. (Table 1)
The structure matrix shows that all the three independent variables are positively correlated
with the first function. The coefficients of the classification function are substantially consistent
with the hypothesis that the quantity (membership) and quality (satisfaction) of social relations
have a positive effect on the objective household economic welfare. In particular, the
coefficients of the variable satisfaction show a behaviour that is similar to the threshold effect
illustrated in section 4.214. (Table 2)
Finally, table 3 shows that about the 68% of the cases are correctly classified15.
The discriminant analysis seems to confirm the effects that emerged in the OLS regressions,
of the interpersonal relations on the objective household economic welfare.
The next section presents the discriminant analysis with reference to the subjective
economic household index.
14

See the coefficient related to the medium and the high objective economic welfare. These two
coefficients are very similar, it is as if the variables satisfaction did not have any role in distinguishing the
observations between the two groups: medium and high objective economic welfare.
15
In this analysis, the Box’s M Test which tests the assumption of equality of covariances across groups
is significant. In order to understand whether the results of the discriminant analysis are still consistent, a
second analysis should be run using a separate-groups covariance matrix. If the results of the analysis
conducted do not give radically different classification results, the first analysis can be accepted. In this
case and in all the next discriminant analysis presented, the Box’s M Test is significant, but in all the
cases considered, the classification results do not change if the analyses are conducted using a separategroups covariance matrix.
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2 The discriminant analysis related to the subjective economic welfare
Tables 4, 5 and 6 show the results of the discriminant analysis with regard to the subjective
economic household index.
Tab. 4 Eigenvalue, Canonical Correlation and Wilks’Lambda
Function Eigenvalue
1
2

.137(a)
.001(a)

% of
Cumulative Canonical Wilks’Lambda Chi- Df Sig.
Variance
%
cor.
Square
99.2
99.2
.347
.878
31.501 6 .000
.8
100.0
.034
.999
.278
2 .870
Tab. 5 Structure Matrix and Classification function

Structure matrix
function 1
function 2

Constant
Membership
Satisfaction
Education

.836(*)
.890(*)
.654

Classification function
low
med
high
subjective
subjective
subjective
economic
economic
economic
welfare
welfare
welfare
-139.070
-148.627
-156.509
-200.620
-190.066
-179.615
103.026
106.842
109.211
-3.828
-4.348
-4.310

.184
-.160
.717(*)

Tab. 6 Classification Results (b,c)

Original

Count

%

Crossvalidate(a)

Count

%

Subjective
economic
welfare
Low

Predicted Group Membership
low
1

medium
0

high
1

Total
2

Med.

21

22

31

74

High

24

34

113

171

Low

50.0

.0

50.0

100.0

Med.

28.4

29.7

41.9

100.0

High

14.0

19.9

66.1

100.0

Low

0

1

1

2

Med.

21

21

32

74

High

24

34

113

171

Low

.0

50.0

50.0

100.0

Med.

28.4

28.4

43.2

100.0

High

14.0

19.9

66.1

100.0

(a) Cross validation is done only for those cases in the analysis. In cross validation, each case is classified
by the functions derived from all cases other than that case.
b 55.1% of original grouped cases correctly classified.
c 54.3 % of cross-validated original grouped cases correctly classified.
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99% of the variance explained by the model is due to the first discriminant function. The
second function contributes little to the model. (Table 4).
The two variables on social relations are positively correlated with the first function and
their coefficients of the classification function assume values coherent with the idea that
interpersonal relations can increase subjective household economic welfare. The effects of the
educational qualification on the subjective economic welfare are not easy to interpret
considering the values assumed by the coefficients of the classification function of this
variables16. (Table 5)
Finally, the percentage of cases correctly classified in this analysis is lower than in the
similar analysis with reference to the objective economic welfare (the 55.1% against the 68%).
(Table 6)
Appendix 3.
A) The subjective household economic welfare index (SEW)
The subjective household economic welfare index was elaborated by calculating the arithmetic
mean of two synthetic indices based on two types of information:
1. the responses of the head of family about the general economic situation of the family
2. the responses about financial difficulties to meet some expenditures.
1. Responses about the general economic situation
This index was obtained as an arithmetic mean of three variables17:
1.a Satisfaction about individual household economic welfare
Very satisfied
=4
Somewhat satisfied
=3
Not very satisfied
=2
Not satisfied
=1
1.b Assesment regarding the economic resources of household members
Very good
=4
Satisfactory
=3
Less than satisfactory
=2
Inadequate
=1

16

In particular, the negative effect of educational qualification on subjective household economic welfare
which is the most interesting result of the OLS regression conducted in section 4.1, is apparently not
confirmed in this analysis. However, it should be considered that only two observations are included in
the group with low household economic welfare. We tried to apply the discriminant analysis aggregating
the three classes of this subjective household economic welfare index into just two classes with more
observations. In this case, it is confirmed both the negative effect of educational qualification and the
positive effect of the two variables membership and satisfaction on the subjective household economic
welfare.
17
The minimum value of these variables is always 1, but the maximum is different (4 or 5). For this
reason, in order to assign the same weight at the different variables it was necessary to compute a
standardization that equalizes the different ranges. The value of the single observation was newly
calculated according to the formula: (x-min)/(n-1), where x is the value of the single observation, min is
the minimum value of the variable and n is the numbers of values that the variable can assume.
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1.c Household economic situation
Very wealthy
Wealthy
Neither wealthy, nor poor
Poor
Very poor

=5
=4
=3
=2
=1

2. Responses about financial difficulties to meet some expenditures
This index was obtained as an arithmetic mean of binary variables revealing the presence (value
1) or the absence (value 2) of difficulties in order to realize some household expenses:
Household expenses: Food, Clothes, Expenses for illness, Rent, Loan, Bills, School, Transports
and Debts
B) The objective household economic welfare index (OEW)
The objective household economic welfare index was created by was elaborated by calculating
the arithmetic mean of two synthetic indices based on two types of information
1. the possession of some durable consumer goods
2. the characteristics of wealth of house.
1. Possession of some durable consumer goods
This index was obtained as arithmetic mean of binary variables revealing the possession (value
2) or not (value 1) of some durable consumer goods.
durable consumer goods: Dishwasher, Washing machine, Video recorder, Video camera, Hi-Fi,
Console (apart from the computer), Computer, Modem, Internet, Answerphone, Fax, Colour
TV, Dish, Mobile telephone, Air conditioner, Bicycle, Scooter, Motorcycle and Car.
2. Characteristics of wealth of house
This index was obtained as an arithmetic mean of the following variables18:
1.a Number of rooms.
A variable assuming a value of 1 if the house has a number of rooms higher than the mean of
the variable and assuming a value of 0 if the house has a number of rooms lower than the mean
1.b Bathroom
No Bathroom
One bathroom
Two bathrooms
More than two bathrooms

=1
=2
=3
=4

1.c House expenses too high
No
Yes

=2
=1

18

See note 17.
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1.d House in poor condition
No
Yes

=2
=1

1.e
Homeowner
Not homeowner

=2
=1

C) The independent variables
The three more important independent variables introduced in the regressions are:
1. Membership: the propensity to participation in “Putnam” associations
Arithmetic mean of the following variables:
Participation in cultural associations (in the last 12 months)
Yes
No
Participation in voluntary organizations (in the last 12 months)
Yes
No
Participation in ecological groups (in the last 12 months)
Yes
No

1
0
1
0

1
0

2.Satisfaction: Satisfaction in the relations with friends
Very satisfied
Somewhat satisfied
Not very satisfied
Not satisfied

=4
=3
=2
=1

3.Educational qualification
Phd
Master’s degree
Bachelor’s degree
Secondary-School certificate (4-5 Years)
Secondary-School certificate (2-3 Years)
Junior high School (from age 11 to 14)
Primary School
No title (literate)
Illiterate

=9
=8
=7
=6
=5
=4
=3
=2
=1
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